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**COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2024/2642**

**of 8 October 2024**

**concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities**

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**COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2024/2642**  
**of 8 October 2024**  
**concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities**

*Article 1*

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

- (a) 'claim' means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and in particular:
- (i) a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;
  - (ii) a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;
  - (iii) a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;
  - (iv) a counterclaim;
  - (v) a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of *exequatur*, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;
- (b) 'contract or transaction' means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for that purpose 'contract' includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;
- (c) 'competent authorities' means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;
- (d) 'economic resources' means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
- (e) 'freezing of economic resources' means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

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- (f) ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;
- (g) ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefit of every kind, including, but not limited to:
- (i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
  - (ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
  - (iii) publicly and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;
  - (iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;
  - (v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
  - (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;
  - (vii) documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;
- (h) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty on European Union applies, under the conditions laid down therein, including their airspace.

*Article 2*

1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal person, entity or body as listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I.
3. Annex I shall include natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that are:

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- (a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country through any of the following actions:
- (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
  - (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
  - (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
  - (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference;
  - (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
  - (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
  - (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
  - (viii) instigating or facilitating an armed conflict in a third country;
- (b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);
- (c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to point (a).

**▼B***Article 3*

1. By way of derogation from Article 2(1) and (2), the competent authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

- (a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
- (b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
- (c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
- (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks prior to the authorisation;
- (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation;
- (f) necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or partner countries in Russia, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Russia enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
- (g) necessary for the provision of electronic communication services by Union telecommunication operators, and for the provision of associated facilities and services necessary for the operation, maintenance and security of such electronic communication services.

2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within 2 weeks of that authorisation.

**▼ B***Article 4*

1. Article 2(1) and (2) shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

- (a) the United Nations (UN), including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
- (b) international organisations;
- (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the UN General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
- (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in UN Humanitarian Response Plans, UN Refugee Response Plans, other UN appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;
- (e) organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate or which are certified or recognised by a Member State in accordance with national procedures;
- (f) Member States' specialised agencies; or
- (g) employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities referred to in points (a) to (f) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities.

2. The exemption set out in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies identified with an asterisk in Annex I.

3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, and by way of derogation from Article 2(1) and (2), the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs.

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4. In the absence of a negative decision, a request for information or a notification for additional time from the relevant competent authority within 5 working days of the date of receipt of a request for authorisation under paragraph 1, that authorisation shall be considered granted.

5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within 4 weeks of such authorisation.

*Article 5*

1. By way of derogation from Article 2(1), the competent authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

- (a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
- (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
- (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
- (d) recognising the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of that authorisation.

*Article 6*

1. By way of derogation from Article 2(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:

- (a) the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

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(b) the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2).

2. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of that authorisation.

*Article 7*

1. Article 2(2) shall not prevent the crediting of frozen accounts by financial or credit institutions that receive funds transferred by third parties onto the account of a listed natural or legal person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent authority about any such transaction without delay.

2. Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
- (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was included in Annex I; or
- (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments are frozen in accordance with Article 2(1).

*Article 8*

1. Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

- (a) supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2(1), to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and
- (b) cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of the information referred to in point (a).

2. Paragraph 1 shall apply subject to national or other applicable rules regarding the confidentiality of information held by judicial authorities, and consistent with respect for the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their clients guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. For that purpose, such communications include those relating to legal advice provided by other certified professionals who are authorised under national law to represent their clients in judicial proceedings, insofar as such legal advice is provided in connection with pending or prospective judicial proceedings.



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3. Any additional information received directly by the Commission shall be made available to the Member States.

4. Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

5. The competent authorities of the Member States, including enforcement authorities, customs authorities within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council <sup>(1)</sup>, competent authorities within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council <sup>(2)</sup>, Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council <sup>(3)</sup> and Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council <sup>(4)</sup>, as well as administrators of official registers wherein natural persons, legal persons, entities and bodies as well as immovable or movable property are registered, shall process and exchange without delay information, including personal data and, if necessary, the information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, with other competent authorities of their Member State, of other Member States and the Commission, if such processing and exchange is necessary to carry out the tasks of the processing authority or the receiving authority under this Regulation, in particular when they detect instances of a breach or circumvention, or attempts at a breach or circumvention, of the prohibitions set out in this Regulation.

*Article 9*

1. It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in this Regulation, including by participating in such activities without deliberately seeking that object or effect but being aware that the participation may have that object or effect and accepting that possibility.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

<sup>(2)</sup> Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

<sup>(3)</sup> Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

<sup>(4)</sup> Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

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2. Natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I shall:
  - (a) report within 6 weeks from the date of listing in Annex I funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State belonging to, owned, held or controlled by them, to the competent authority of the Member State where those funds or economic resources are located; and
  - (b) cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of such information.
3. Failure to comply with paragraph 2 of this Article shall be considered as participation, as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 2.
4. The Member State concerned shall inform the Commission within 2 weeks of the information received pursuant to paragraph 2, point (a).
5. Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.
6. Any processing of personal data shall be carried out in accordance with this Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, and only insofar as is necessary for the application of this Regulation.

*Article 10*

1. The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or withheld as a result of negligence.
2. Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

*Article 11*

1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

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- (a) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
  - (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
2. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

*Article 12*

1. The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of:
- (a) funds frozen under Article 2 and authorisations granted under the derogations set out in this Regulation;
  - (b) violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.
2. The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

*Article 13*

1. Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2, it shall amend Annex I accordingly.
2. The Council shall communicate a decision pursuant to paragraph 1, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known and if such communication can be effected, or through the publication of a notice, providing that natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to submit observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decision concerned and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.

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4. The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
5. The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

*Article 14*

1. Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned.
2. Annex I shall contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

*Article 15*

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall also provide for appropriate measures of confiscation of the proceeds of such infringements.
2. Member States shall notify the Commission of the rules referred to in paragraph 1 without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

*Article 16*

1. The Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) may process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Regulation. Those tasks include:
  - (a) as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annex I;
  - (b) as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annex I;
  - (c) as regards the Commission:
    - (i) adding the contents of Annex I to the electronic, consolidated list of natural and legal persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both of which are publicly available;

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- (ii) processing information on the impact of the measures of this Regulation, such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

2. The Council, the Commission and the High Representative shall process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annex I.

3. For the purposes of this Regulation, the Council, the Commission and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of Article 3, point 8, of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under that Regulation.

*Article 17*

1. Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in Annex II. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex II.

2. Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

3. Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

*Article 18*

Any information provided or received in accordance with this Regulation shall be used by the Commission only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

*Article 19*

This Regulation shall apply:

- (a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
- (b) on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
- (c) to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;

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- (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
- (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

*Article 20*

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

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## ANNEX I

## List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2

## ▼M1

## A. Natural persons

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	Artem Sergeevich KUREEV (Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)	Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the 'African Initiative', Founder of 'Rusafro' DOB: 24.10.1980 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4002209800 Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259	Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies.  Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
2.	Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN (Russian: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)	Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160	Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called 'Doppelganger' campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union's Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia's disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.	
3.	Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA  (Russian: Софья Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)	Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female	Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called 'Doppelganger' campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union's Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called 'Team I' lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin's campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition.  Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024



	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
4.	<p>Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV</p> <p>(Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)</p>	<p>Commander of GRU unit 29155</p> <p>Major General</p> <p>DOB: 29.9.1967</p> <p>POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)</p> <p>Nationality: Russian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Tax Identification Number (INN): 77337888007</p>	<p>Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries.</p> <p>In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali.</p> <p>Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.</p>	16.12.2024
5.	<p>Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI</p> <p>a.k.a.</p> <p>Tina KANDELAKI</p> <p>(Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)</p>	<p>Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding</p> <p>DOB: 10.11.1975</p> <p>POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia)</p> <p>Nationality: Georgian</p> <p>Gender: female</p>	<p>Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea.</p> <p>Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	<p>Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt</p> <p>DOB: 23.5.1971</p> <p>POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)</p> <p>Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany.</p> <p>Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
7.	<p>Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV</p> <p>(Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)</p>	<p>GRU colonel</p> <p>DOB: 26.8.1976</p> <p>POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)</p> <p>Nationality: Russian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Passport number: 672904784466</p>	<p>Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries.</p> <p>The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe.</p> <p>Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
8.	Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO  (Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)	GRU officer DOB: 28.9.1974 POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4015400649	Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym 'Wlodek Lyakh'. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails.  Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024
9.	Yuriy SIZOV  (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)	GRU military officer DOB: 17.2.1988 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 784805190577	Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity.  Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
10.	<p>Visa Nokhayeovich MIZAEV (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) a.k.a. Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV; Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; Visa Nokhaievych MIZAEV; Oleg SHISHKIN</p>	<p>Entrepreneur DOB: 9.7.1963 POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410</p>	<p>Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).</p> <p>Therefore, Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.</p>	16.12.2024
11.	<p>Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA (Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА) a.k.a. Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA; Olga Alekseevna BELJAWZEWA; Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV</p>	<p>Entrepreneur DOB: 25.10.1969 POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621</p>	<p>Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies 'OOO Agronom-sad' and 'OOO Biplast'. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev's involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base.</p> <p>Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
12.	Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV  (Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)	Political scientist DOB: 28.1.1973 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.  Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate.  Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
13.	Harouna DOUAMBA	Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'investissement DOB: 8.1.1973 POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast Nationality: Ivorian Gender: male	Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso.  In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called <i>Aimons Notre Afrique</i> (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the <i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations.  Harouna Douamba's disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
14.	Anatolii PRIZENKO	<p>Businessman, employed by the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company</p> <p>DOB: 26.11.1974</p> <p>POB: Moldovan SSR (now Moldova)</p> <p>Nationality: Moldovan</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Anatolii Prizenko is a Moldovan businessman working for the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several Moldovan citizens to France, where they painted stars of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect, in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. The images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.</p> <p>Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.</p> <p>Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
15.	Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC  Алесья МИЛЮРАДОВИЧ or Олесья МИЛЮРАДОВИЧ	Russian Government employee, ‘Foreign Affairs Facilitator’  Associate of the project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ (‘Иностранные журналисты за Россию’)  DOB: 10.3.1968  POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female	Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a ‘foreign affairs facilitator’.  Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called ‘electoral observation’ mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.  She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine.  Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	16.12.2024



	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
16.	Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO (Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)	Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer DOB: 18.5.1978 POB: Bishkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) Nationality: Russian Gender: Male	Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of 'Officers of Russia' an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the 'Russian House' in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers.  Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	16.12.2024

## B. Legal persons, entities and bodies

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	GRU Unit 29155 ФКУ 'Войсковая Часть 29155'	Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A Registration No: 7719737879 OGRN: 1097746770395	GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.	16.12.2024
2.	Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement GPCI	Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022	<i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.	16.12.2024

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
3.	African Initiative	Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: September 2023	<p>African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.</p> <p>Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	16.12.2024

*ANNEX II***Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the Commission**

## BELGIUM

[https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy\\_areas/peace\\_and\\_security/sanctions](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions)

## BULGARIA

<https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions>

## CZECHIA

<https://fau.gov.cz/en/international-sanctions>

## DENMARK

<https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/sanktioner>

## GERMANY

<https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html>

## ESTONIA

<https://vm.ee/sanktsioonid-ekspordi-ja-relvastuskontroll/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid>

## IRELAND

<https://www.dfa.ie/our-role/policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/>

## GREECE

<http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html>

## SPAIN

<https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx>

## FRANCE

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/>

## CROATIA

<https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955>

## ITALY

[https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica\\_europea/misure\\_deroghe/](https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/)

## CYPRUS

<https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/>

## LATVIA

<https://www.fid.gov.lv/en>

## LITHUANIA

<http://www.urm.lt/sanctions>

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## LUXEMBOURG

<https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html>

## HUNGARY

<https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato>

## MALTA

<https://smb.gov.mt/>

## NETHERLANDS

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties>

## AUSTRIA

<https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/>

## POLAND

<https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankeje-miedzynarodowe>

<https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions>

## PORTUGAL

<https://portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas>

## ROMANIA

<http://www.mae.ro/node/1548>

## SLOVENIA

[http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni\\_ukrepi](http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi)

## SLOVAKIA

[https://www.mzv.sk/europske\\_zalezitosti/europske\\_politiky-sankcie\\_eu](https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu)

## FINLAND

<https://um.fi/pakotteet>

## SWEDEN

<https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner>

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) SPA2 The Pavillion Rue de Spa 2 B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Email: [relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu](mailto:relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu)